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can now be secured in any administrative order:-The discretion of the court
is again controlling. P. T. M.
DEFAMATION-LIABILrrY OF BROADCASTING STATION FOIL EXTEMPORANEOUS
DEFAMATION BY ONE NOT IN EMPLOY OF STATiN.-Defendant broadcasting
company leased its facilities to an advertising corporation which hired a
performer to speak on a series of programs sponsored by another company.
Defendant approved a prepared script and a rehearsal of the program. During
the actual broadcast the performer made an extemporaneous remark upon
which plaintiff brought action in trespass for defamation. Held, defendant
not liable. Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co. (Pa. 1939), 8 A.
(2d) 302.
The principal case presents for the first time the question of liability of a
broadcaster for an alleged defamation not in the script, made on an unprivi-
leged occasion, 1 by one not the agent of the broadcaster. 2 One previous case
declared radio defamation to be libel and the station responsible in damages
where the defamatory remarks appeared in a prepared script available for
inspection. 3 In this case and three others approving its reasoning the courts
endorse the analogy of the broadcast to newspaper publication.4 Two cases
have held radio defamation to be slander. 5
Defamation is a false publication made without legal excuse or privilege
which is calculated to bring one into disrepute.6 Publication is the trans-
mission of ideas and thoughts to the perception of a person other than a
party to the suit.7 Heretofore it has been said that due care is not considered
in cases of publication.8 This is clearly true in the cases of newspaper pub-
lishers who are held absolutely liable for defamation they print.9 However,
where messengers and news agents have been able to show that without
negligence they had no knowledge of the defamation they helped disseminate
it has been held a legal excuse or no publication.1 0 It would seem clear that
lIrwin v. Ashurst (1937), 158 Ore. 61, 74 P. (2d) 1127. Broadcast of
trial proceedings wherein lawyer defamed witness held privileged.
2 3 Restatement, Torts (1937) § 577, refuses by means of a caveat to com-
ment as to the law in this exact situation. See also 12 Proceedings American
Law Institute 355 and 14 Proceedings American Law Institute 73 for the dis-
cussions of the problem where it is brought out that a script was submitted
to the broadcaster in Sorenson v. Wood (1932), 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82.
3 Sorenson v. Wood (1932), 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82.
4 Coffee v. Midland Broadcasting Co. (1934), 8 F. Supp. 889; Miles v.
Wasmer (1933), 172 Wash. 466, 20 P. (2d) 847; Irwin v. Ashurst (1937),
158 Ore. 61, 74 P. (2d) 1127.
5 Locke v. Gibbons (1937), 299 N. Y. S. 188, (where action was not against
the broadcaster but against the announcer); Meldrum v. Australian Broad-
casting Co. (1932), Victoria L. R. 425 (Australia), 6 Australian Law
Journal 431.
6 1 Cooley on Torts (4th ed. 1932) § 136.
7 Harper, The Law of Tort (1933), § 236.
8 Harper, The Law of Tort (1933), § 237.
9 Taylor v. Hearst (1895), 107 Cal. 262, 40 P. 392.
lOLayton v. Harris (1840), 3 Harrington (Del.), 406; Day v. Bream
(1837), 174 Eng. Rep. 212; Arnold v. Ingram (1912), 151 Wis. 438, 138
N. W. 111; Ernmens v. Pottle (1885), 55 L. J. Q. B. 51, 16 Q. B. D. 354.
RECENT CAlSE NOTES
the broadcaster is a publisher of all it broadcasts.11 The question remains
whether, under the facts of this case, the broadcaster is absolutely liable as is
the newspaper publisher.
The newspaper analogy is consistent in those cases where the defamation
is in a written script which may be edited. Such cases may be decided because
of failure to exercise due care. In the principal case we have an entirely new
type of publication. One cannot conceive of an extemporaneous remark being
interpolated into a newspaper. Furthermore, the superior control to prevent
publication by printing as compared to the control a station has which has
leased all of its facilities is evident. The newspaper analogy cannot be
extended to the case being considered.
Actionable defamation requires an intent to publish the defamatory matter.
The defendant must have voluntarily published the statement. 12 Obviously
here, the defendant intended to publish only what appeared in the script and
the extemporaneous remark was not published voluntarily.
Absolute liability is imposed in cases where the insurance of society requires
that one engaging in particularly dangerous conduct must assume the risk of
damage to others from his conduct irrespective of fault. Unless the risk to
others is unreasonable, liability will be imposed only upon showing lack of
due care. 1 3 It is submitted that the court correctly refused to impose absolute
liability to a government-regulated industry where defamations have been so
infrequent.
An early news dealer case said, "To hold defendant a publisher would
make the law unfair, unreasonable and unjust. No proposition which offends
in this way can be a part of the common law."14 Even if one chose to reject
the news dealer analogy, to hold a broadcaster liable under facts as in the
principal case would seem unreasonable and offensive. The court commendably
did not make such a proposition a part of the common law.
Libel, with its greater liability, developed from slander, which upon the
invention of the printing press proved an inadequate remedy for the longer
deliberated, more permanent, and wider circulated printed defamation.1 5 Now
we again have a new method of publication differing from those for which the
present law of defamation was created. To meet the situation a few states
have adopted applicable statutes.1 6 However, the suggestion of the court to
112 Socolow, Law of Radio Broadcasting (1939), § 466; Remick v. General
Electric Co. (1926), 16 F. (2d) 829; Fisher's Blend Station v. State Tax
Comm. (1936), 297 U. S. 650, 56 S. Ct. 650.
12Harper, The Law of Tort (1933), §237.
13Ames, "Law and Morals" (1908), 22 Harv. L. Rev. 97, 99; Holmes,
The Common Law (1881), 10S; Harper, The Law of Tort (1933), § 155.
14 Emmens v. Pottle (1885), 55 L. J. Q. B. 51, 16 Q. B. D. 354.
15 Veeder, History and Theory of Law of Defamation (1903), 3 Col. L.
R. 546.
16 Ill., Smith-Hurd (State Bar Assn. ed.) 1937, c. 126, §§4, 5, p. 3015
(slander); N. Dak., Laws of N. Dak. 1929, c. 117; Iowa, Acts of Reg. Sess.
1937, c. 238, (due care is good defense); Wash., Laws 1935, c. 117, p. 329
(libel, but allows absolute defense of prompt retraction if requested and no
knowledge of libelous content) ; Calif., Statutes 1931 (criminal code), p. 120
(criminal slander upon showing intent to defame); Ore., Laws 1935 (criminal
code), c. 366, p. 681 (criminal slander upon showing intent to defame).
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create a new tort along the lines of due care to fit radio defamation appears
to be the most logical and uniform method of handling the problem.
Indiana's statute regarding radio defamation does not define the liability
of the broadcaster.1 7 The implication is thatif is absolute liability as in libel
since it provides for mitigation of damages by retraction, the same as the
statute applicable to newspapers.1 8
The few available decisions may be harmonized by adopting the defense
of due care. From such a view the present state of the law would appear to
be that if the defamation is in a prepared script, available to the broadcaster,
he is liable in the absence of privilege because failure to prevent publication
is a lack of due care. If the defamation is extemporaneous, the broadcaster is
liable for slander upon showing lack of due care. If the speaker is the agent
of the broadcaster, of course respondeat superior will apply. R. B. W.
TAXATION-MULTIPLE TAXATION OF INTANGIBLE PRoPERTy.-Decedent, domi-
ciled in Tennessee, transferred securities in trust to an Alabama trustee,
reserving the power to remove the trustee and to dispose of the trust estate
by her will. Decedent bequeathed the trust property to the trustee in trust
but in different amounts and by different estates from those provided for
by the trust indenture. Both Tennessee and Alabama asserted the right to
impose an inheritance tax on the trust property passing under decedent's
will. Plaintiffs allege that both states cannot constitutionally place a tax
on the property. Held, both states may impose an inheritance tax on the trust
property. Curry v. McCanless (1939), 307 U. S. 357, 59 S. Ct. 900. Decedent
'transferred bonds to a Colorado trustee to hold for specified trust purposes
reserving the power to change any beneficiary and to revoke the trust and
reinvest title in herself. After creating the trust, decedent became a domiciled
resident of New York where she died without appointing new beneficiaries
of the trust or revoking it. Both states assessed a tax on the transfer at
death of the trust fund. Held, not in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
for New York to place an inheritance tax on the trust property after Colorado
has already done so. Graves u. Elliott (1939), 307 U. S. 383, 59 S. Ct. 913.
Early in this century the Supreme Court held that it was a denial of due
process for Kentucky to place a tax on an incorporeal hereditament (franchise)
derived from Indiana and owned by a Kentucky corporation because the
franchise had a situs in Indiana and had already been taxed by Indiana.1
Next it was held that coal, property of a Pennsylvania corporation, but stored
in other states, could not be used in enhancing the value of the capital stock
of the corporation for purposes of taxation.2 These two decisions were a
foundation for the rule that tangible property is subject to taxation only in
the state where permanently located and not by the state of the owner's
domicile.3 The court was careful to point out that it was making no rule
17 Acts 1937, c. 37, § 1, p. 231, Burns '33, § 2-517 (Supp. 38).
18 Acts 1895, c. 45, Sec. 1, Burns '33, § 2-104-3.
ILouisville and Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky (1903), 188 U. S.
385, 23 S. Ct. 463.
2 Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania (1905),
198 U. S. 34-1, 25 S. Ct. 669.
, 3 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky (1905), 199 U. S. 194, 26
S. Ct. 36.
